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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(h). < 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the district court have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Tracy 
sufficient to ensue with its contempt proceedings? Although the question of 
whether a person has been served with process is a fact question, whether a person 
is properly served is a question of law. Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n.3 ( 
(Utah 1991). 
2. Did the district court properly find Mr. Tracy to be in contempt of 
the court's prior child support order? On appeal, a court of review looks to a trial 
court's exercise of its contempt power to determine whether it exceeded the scope 
of its lawful discretion. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976); 
see also Dansie v. Dansie. 1999 UT App 92, ^  65 977 P.2d 539 ("An order relating 
to contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court."). 
3. Did the district court err in refusing to offset Mr. Tracy's child 
support arrears? Interpretation of the Child Support Act presents a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness, see Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob 
Family Chalk Creek, LLC, 2010 UT App 112, 233 P.3d 529 ("The proper 
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for 
correctness . . . . " (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW AND RULES INVOLVED 
The determinative statutory provision and rule involved in this case are as follows: 
1. Utah Code § 78B-6-315(1), (2), and (3), which states, in part: 
(1) When a court of competent jurisdiction . . . makes an order 
requiring a parent to furnish support... for his child, and the parent 
fails to do so, proof of noncompliance shall be prima facie evidence 
of contempt of court. 
(2) Proof of noncompliance may be demonstrated by showing that: 
(a) the order was made, and filed with the district court; and 
(b) the parent knew of the order because: 
(i) the order was mailed to the parent at his last-known 
address as shown on the court records; 
(ii) the parent was present in court at the time the order was 
pronounced; 
(iii) the parent entered into a written stipulation and the 
parent or counsel for the parent was sent a copy of the order; 
(iv) counsel was present in court and entered into a 
stipulation which was accepted and the order based upon the 
stipulation was then sent to counsel for the parent; or 
(v) the parent was properly served and failed to answer. 
(3) Upon establishment of a prima facie case of contempt under 
Subsection (2), the obligor under the child support order has the 
burden of proving inability to comply with the child support order. 
2. Rule 4(c)(1) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the county in which 
it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, 
address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and 
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state 
the time within which the defendant is required to answer the 
complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of 
failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against the 
defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the 
court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten 
days of service. 
o 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This proceeding originated in the Fourth District Court, State of < 
Utah, under case no. 904400716. (R. 1-3). The parties are parents of one child, 
but were never married. (R. 1-3). 
2. An order for child support was entered approximately August 8, 
1995, requiring Mr. Tracy to pay $250.00 per month in child support to Ms. 
Vicchrilli. (R.at85). 
3. On November 11, 2009, Ms. Vicchrilli filed a motion for order to 
show cause seeking judgment against Mr. Tracy, for unpaid child support. (R. at 
111). Her motion was supported by an affidavit and an order to show cause issued 
by the district court requiring Mr. Tracy to appear. (R. 112-116). 
4. The hearing was scheduled for January 11, 2010, before 
Commissioner Thomas R. Patton, and Mr. Tracy failed to appear, (R. at 115), 
though he was personally served on December 29, 2009. (R. 124, 130). A default 
judgment was entered against him in the amount of $11,670.00 for past-due child 
support and Ms. Vicchrilli was awarded attorney fees in the amount of $750.00. 
(R. 131, 135-138). 
5. The Commissioner further found Mr. Tracy in contempt of court and 
sentenced Mr. Tracy to two days jail, which sentence was stayed pending his 
entering (within 60 days) into a written payment plan with Ms. Vicchrilli to satisfy 
his back-due support obligation no later than two years from January 11, 2010. (R. 
at 131). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. On February 19,2010, Mr. Tracy filed an objection to the 
Commissioner's recommendation. (R. 133-134). 
7. An objection hearing was held before Judge Samuel D. McVey on 
June 14, 2010, at which time the court set aside the Commissioner's January 11, 
2010, recommendation concerning Mr. Tracy's default, but entered judgment 
against Mr. Tracy in the amount of $8,670.00 for undisputed back-due child 
support and scheduled a de novo hearing for July 26, 2010, to address (1) whether 
Mr. Tracy owed or should be credited an additional $3,000.00 in back-due child 
support, and (2) whether Mr. Tracy was in contempt of court and should be subject 
to additional sanctions. (R. at 169). 
8. At the July 26, 2010, hearing, the court received evidence and 
argument from the parties, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
stated the order of the court from the bench. (R. 231-232). 
9. In summary, the court denied Mr. Tracy's request to apply the 
$3,000.00 credit to his arrearages and entered judgment of $11,670.00 in back-due 
support plus attorney fees in favor of Ms. Vicchrilli and ordered Mr. Tracy to 
make minimum monthly payments of $250.00 commencing August 2010 towards 
satisfaction of said judgment. (R. 244-250). 
10. The court found Mr. Tracy in contempt of court, but scheduled a 
review hearing for December 3, 2010, to provide Mr. Tracy an opportunity to 
purge his contempt by being current in his monthly payments at that time. The 
4 
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i 
court informed that further sanctions would result if Mr. Tracy was not compliant 
with the court's orders at the December 3, 2010, hearing. (R. 244-248). ( 
11. The orders were signed by the court on August 30, 2010, and Notice 
of Appeal was filed by Mr. Tracy on or about September 3, 2010. (R. at 252). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court orders finding Mr. Tracy in contempt of court for failure 
to pay child support as well as the judgment amount for arrears should be ( 
affirmed. 
The court has personal jurisdiction over Mr. Tracy inasmuch as he was 
properly served a valid order to show cause notifying him of the initial hearing 
before the court commissioner and because he fully participated in two subsequent 
hearings before the trial judge. 
Because Mr. Tracy (1) knew of the child support order and his duty to 
make monthly payments, (2) had the ability to comply with the child support 
order, and (3) willfully disobeyed the order by failing to make any payments for a 
number of years, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding him in 
contempt of court and entering judgment based on the evidence. 
Finally, the trial court properly denied Mr. Tracy's request to apply a credit 
to his back-due child support in the amount of $3,000.00. Mr. Tracy asserts that 
said amount was given directly to the parties' daughter after she became an adult, 
for college expenses, and that such merits offset to the amount owed Ms. 
Vicchrilli. It is well-settled law in Utah that back-due support is owed to the 
5 
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recipient parent and that absent waiver or agreement the obligor cannot reduce his 
arrearages by payment to another source. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT OBTAINED PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER MR. TRACY. 
Because Mr. Tracy was personally served an order to show cause and later 
fully participated in two hearings before the trial judge, the district court obtained 
and properly exercised personal jurisdiction in this matter. 
In the present case, an order to show cause was the document, rather than a 
summons, served on Mr. Tracy to apprise him of the pending hearing before the 
court commissioner. See Record at 124, 130 for proof of service documents. Rule 
4 does not directly speak to service of an order to show cause and Mr. Tracy 
apparently relies on an assumption that the two should be treated the same for 
purposes of this analysis. However, there are significant differences between an 
initial action and an enforcement proceeding, and there is no authority stating that 
service of an order to show cause must strictly comply with Rule 4. Rather, Rule 
6(d) seems to apply to order to show cause actions: "Notice of a hearing shall be 
served not later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a 
different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may 
for cause shown be made on ex parte application." Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d). 
Nonetheless, assuming the comparison is appropriate, let us assume that an 
order to show cause is essentially the same as a summons. Rule 4 of the Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
Rules of Civil Procedure describes the content of a summons, with its fundamental 
purpose to ensure notice that is "reasonably calculated, under all the < 
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4)(B). Courts are directed to "construe the technical 
requirements of Rule 4 in light of this guiding principle." State v. Hamilton, 2003 
U T 2 2 , t 2 8 , 7 0 P . 3 d l l l . 
While Rule 4(c)(1) mandates that a summons "state the name, address and 
telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs 
address and telephone number," this requirement primarily serves to provide a 
location to which an answer or response may be mailed. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). 
However, this requirement is optional in certain pleadings such as a Request For 
Protective Order pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act or a Verified Petition For 
Ex Parte Child Protective Order. See www.utcourts.gov "Forms" section for 
court-approved documents. This is likely to ensure safety to a person, who in the 
context of abuse or domestic violence may have an added safety concern and wish 
for that information to be kept from a Respondent, yet this highlights that address 
and phone information is more functional than absolutely necessary for purposes 
of personal jurisdiction. 
The sole contention of Mr. Tracy on this issue is that because the order to 
show cause served to him on December 29, 2009, did not contain Ms. Vicchrilli's 
address and phone number, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction 
over him and the subsequent proceedings are ineffectual. There is no argument 
7 
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that he was not personally served, that he was not aware of the court and parties to 
the action, that he did not understand the nature of the proceeding, or that he was 
not informed of the date and time of the show cause hearing. 
A review of the record shows that Ms. Vicchrilli did include her address 
and phone number on the motion for order to show cause, affidavit in support of 
motion for order to show cause, and order to show cause documents filed in the 
district court. .See Record at 111, 112, and 115. However, the copies of the 
documents served on Mr. Tracy appear to have been redacted by the serving entity 
removing Ms. Vicchrilli's address and phone number. See Record at 124. 
Notwithstanding, the original documents filed in court contained that information 
and were available to Mr. Tracy upon request of a copy of the court file. 
Mr. Tracy attempts to analogize the present case with Parkside Salt Lake 
Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc.. 2001 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 1202, in which an unlawful 
detainer action governed by statute as a summary proceeding required a special 
court indorsement of a shortened Summons to be effective. Because this case does 
not deal with unlawful detainer or shortened summons governed by statute, the 
analogy is inapplicable. 
Thus, the argument that the Order to Show Cause pleadings were not 
effective to confer personal jurisdiction simply because they lacked an address and 
phone number of Ms. Vicchrilli is not supported by law and is unpersuasive. 
Furthermore, Mr. Tracy folly participated in two subsequent hearings 
before the trial judge where he testified, made argument, and submitted evidence, 
a 
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thus waiving the right to argue personal jurisdiction. See State Tax Comm. v. 
Larsen, 110 P.2d 558 (Utah 1941) ("[T]he question of jurisdiction may be raised at < 
any time, by proper application, unless it has been waived by general 
appearance."); see also, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) 
("Waiver is deemed to occur when the totality of the circumstances indicates an 
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known constitutional right."). 
For the above reasons, Mr. Tracy's request to hold that the district court 
lacked personal jurisdiction should be denied. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND MR. TRACY IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR FAILURE TO PAY CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
In Utah, in order for a party to be found in contempt for failure to pay child 
support, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the party (1) 
knew what was required, (2) had the ability to comply, and (3) willfully failed to 
follow the court's orders. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-315; Coleman v. Coleman, 
664P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah 1983). 
Only rarely does a court of review reverse the trial court's decision in a 
contempt proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the absence of 
any action [by the trial court] which is so unreasonable as to be classified as 
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of. . . discretion, we will not overturn the 
trial court's order." Dansie. 1999 UT App 92, If 6, 977 P.2d 539. 
9 
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Mr. Tracy did not argue below that he was without knowledge of the child 
support order and the record clearly indicates that he had been served and was 
aware of the child support order established in 1995. 
It is a prerequisite to any contempt proceeding that the "one charged should 
be found able to comply with the court's order or that he had intentionally 
deprived himself of the ability to comply with such order." Osmus v. Osmus, 198 
P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1948) (emphasis added by the court). The defense that an 
obligor lacks the ability to pay court ordered support is only effective, where the 
person charged exercises due diligence towards compliance of his obligation. See 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1978). 
In Osmus, the Court held that when a valid order is in place "any failure to 
comply or to make a reasonable effort to comply is contempt, and punishable as 
such." 198P.2dat235. Furthermore, the Osmus Court held that a payor of 
support does not have the right to sacrifice the rights of those he is obligated 
towards so that "at some indefinite future time he may better his own financial 
status." Id. The Court held that providing for those to whom he is obligated is his 
first duty, and if he must forego opportunities with bright future prospects in order 
to perform his obligations, the law requires him to do so. Id 
In Mancil v. Smith, the Court illuminates this rationale, explaining that an 
obligor cannot put off his responsibility of support by being voluntarily 
unemployed or under-employed, because doing so would "hold hostage" a child's 
right to ongoing support because of the "parent's desire to get a higher education, 
1 n 
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even if the parent's [training] will eventually allow the parent to pay support at a 
higher level." 2000 UT App 378, H 16, 18 P.3d 509. i 
In Kessimakis, the obligor had failed to make support payments and 
accrued arrears in the amount of $16,000.00. 580 P.2d at 1091. He claimed that 
he was not in contempt of court, because he neither had the ability to pay or the 
willful disobedience required for contempt. Id The court held that defense was 
ineffective when the obligor did not at least exercise due diligence and make 
reasonable efforts in compliance with the order. Id at 1092. 
In the instant case, Mr. Tracy failed to pay support, making only three 
token payments totaling $330.00 during an approximate five-year period. Mr. 
Tracy's choice to further his education and employment in lieu of paying support 
was an intentional deprivation of his ability to make his ordered payments. 
Mr. Tracy testified at the July 26, 2010, to the following circumstances: 1) 
that he had been working since the birth of the parties' daughter, 2) that he 
attended higher education while working receiving a bachelor degree and a 
master's degree and is currently pursuing a law degree, 3) that he worked as an 
arms control specialist for the U.S. Army, 4) and that he worked as a clerk in a 
German district court. See Brief of Appellant, Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 34, 
lines 7-17; page 35, lines 11-15, 20-23. These admissions provided clear and 
convincing evidence that Mr. Tracy had some ability, if not complete ability, to 
comply with the support order. Mr. Tracy also admitted that he could currently 
11 
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make monthly payments notwithstanding his tight budget. See Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 36, lines 14-17. 
Mr. Tracy's attempt to introduce irrelevant and false allegations that the 
parties' daughter had not actually lived with Ms. Vicchrilli or that she had 
secluded herself and their daughter during her minority further suggests that Mr. 
Tracy had a motive and willfully refused to pay child support. See Brief of 
Appellant, Addendum, Exhibit 1, page 17, lines 16-24; page 31, lines 9-22. 
Finally, the district court's decision to award Ms. Vicchrilli monthly 
payments to satisfy the arrearage deficit was a proper use of discretion. Child 
support, when reduced to a judgment does not lose its character as a family 
support instrument. Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah 1997). It is 
different from other forms of commercial or ordinary debt, and for this reason a 
court has discretion to enforce the judgment by equitable means via providing a 
payment plan. Id 
The trial court appropriately made a finding that Mr. Tracy is in contempt 
of the child support order, and exercised its discretion in requiring a minimum 
monthly payment and providing Mr. Tracy an opportunity to purge his contempt. 
Therefore, the trial court's findings and order on contempt should be affirmed. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN OFFSET TO 
MR. TRACY'S CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS. 
Installments of support payments ordered in a domestic case become vested 
in the recipient when they become due. Bates v. Bates. 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977); 
10 
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Larsenv. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977). See also, Bernard v. Attebury, 629 
P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1981) (explaining that support payments become unalterable < 
debts as they accrue, and courts may not retroactively reduce or excuse past-due 
support obligations). 
An obligor is not entitled to receive credit for back-due support by later 
directly paying the adult child unless written consent from the obligee is obtained 
or a court finds good cause for issuing the offset. Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 
603-04 (Utah 1979). Doing so would allow the obligor to vary the terms of the 
court order and usurp the right to determine how the money should be spent. Id. 
Rather, in Utah, support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue, owed 
to the obligee, unless voluntarily waived in writing. Larsen, 561 P.2d at 1079; see 
also Utah Code § 78B-12-109. 
Mr. Tracy cites the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 
1976), in support of the proposition that Ms. Vicchrilli waived her right to seek 
back-due child support. Two clear differences, however, prevent Wasescha from 
being applicable in the present case. First, in Wasescha, the obligee seeking an 
award of arrearages had admitted that she was not seeking to "reimburse" herself 
and the trial court found her overall testimony to be dubious at best. IcL at 895-
896. Second, Mr. Tracy's allegation that the parties' child had not resided with 
Ms. Vicchrilli was unsupported, objected to, and false. 
In the instant case, Mr. Tracy is seeking a $3,000.00 credit to his support 
arrearages for money allegedly paid to the parties' daughter after she became an 
n 
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adult. Mr. Tracy testified the money was given for college expenses. Because 
Ms. Vicchrilli never agreed that these payments to her daughter would act as a 
credit for Mr. Tracy's arrearages, the payments can only be construed as a gift and 
do not apply as a credit towards arrearages owed to Ms. Vicchrilli. Therefore, the 
trial court's ruling should be upheld. 
IV. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL 
This Court "generally award[s] attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing 
party if the trial court awarded attorney fees and the receiving party prevails on the 
main issues on appeal." See Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, f 43, 45 P.3d 176. 
Because Ms. Vicchrilli was awarded attorney fees below, it is reasonable and 
proper for her to also be awarded her fees and costs incurred in defending against 
this action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee, Rebecca Vicchrilli, respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the Fourth District's ruling and judgment, and that 
Appellee be awarded attorney fees and costs in this matter. 
Dated: Uttcd<\ **
 ( £o l l 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Za^naiy^T Starr 
Cdukselfor Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no 
addendum is offered or necessary. 
( 
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